Learning Chinese? The changing investment behavior of foreign institutions in the Chinese stock market by Korkeamäki, T et al.
 i 
Learning Chinese? The changing investment behavior of foreign 
institutions in the Chinese stock market* 
Timo Korkeamäki** 



















December 4, 2018 
Abstract 
We analyze preferences of foreign institutional investors in the Chinese stock market in a 
sample that covers 2003 to 2014. We find that foreign investors changed their investment 
behavior during the sample period from generic patterns found in much of the world to China-
specific patterns. The results suggest that foreign institutions learned to adjust their investment 
behavior to account for unique features of the Chinese market. 
 
JEL classification: G11, G15 
Keywords: foreign investor, institutional investor, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(QFII) scheme, China 
* We thank Zuzana Fungacova, and seminar participants at the 2015 IFABS meeting in 
Hangzhou, China, 2015 FMA Annual Meeting in Orlando, FL, and 2015 EFMA meeting in 





Geographical distance accounts for some of the information asymmetry that arises in 
institutional investor behavior and performance. This is seen both internationally (Ferreira et 
al., 2017) and at the national level in the US (Baik et al., 2010). Ferreira et al. (2017) also report 
that domestic institutions enjoy an advantage over foreign competitors in opaque markets. 
Building on the theoretical work of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), Choi et al. (2017) 
discuss the roles of information and learning of institutional investors in foreign markets. Their 
findings, which defy the predictions of portfolio theory, suggest institutions tackle the 
informational challenges of foreign markets through selective and targeted research. Foreign 
institutions utilize their sophistication, global market knowledge, and ability to learn by 
focusing on areas, industries, and firms where they can gain a competitive advantage. 
China provides an interesting testing ground for theories and empirical regularities found 
in other markets. The Chinese market also has unique characteristics such as its 
underdeveloped legal infrastructure and corporate governance mechanisms, as well as 
extensive governmental involvement in corporate ownership (Allen et al., 2009). Financial 
analysis in China is hampered by a lack of historical data. For example, the main boards of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges only opened in the early 1990s. Such unique features 
limit the ability of foreign institutions to use investment methods tested in other markets and 
impose a steep learning curve. At the same time, China’s markets are attractive. Ferreira et al. 
(2017), considering domestic and foreign institutional holdings in each of the 32 countries in 
their sample, and that the alphas for both institution types are the highest for China. The growth 
of the Chinese economy continues to outpace Western markets, and the Chinese stock market 
now accounts for over 10% of global market capitalization. China is hard for global investors 
to ignore (Carpenter et al., 2018). 
China’s Qualified Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme allows foreign institutional 
investors to invest directly in the domestic securities in China, including the A-share market, 
which, during our sample period, was the only way to invest in equity of a large number of 
Chinese companies. The QFII program has grown rapidly since its introduction in 2002. The 
total investment quota has increased from the original $424 million for 10 institutions to 284 
approved foreign institutions and a combined quota of $93 billion as of July 2017.1 Despite 
seemingly lively interest in QFII, their combined total was only about 4% of the market 
                                                          
1 Information from Shanghai Stock Exchange web pages at http://english.sse.com.cn/overseasinvestors/qfii/intro/. 
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capitalization of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, and furthermore, foreign institutions 
utilized only a fraction of their quotas, possibly due to restrictions on asset allocation and 
repatriation of capital (Carpenter et al., 2018; Alford and Lau, 2015). Underrepresentation of 
the Chinese stock market in both world and emerging market indices has also contributed to 
the relative lack of institutional investment by reducing interest among institutions seeking to 
track those indices. This pattern of limited and focused investment by QFIIs is in line with the 
finding of Choi et al. (2017) that foreign institutional investors tend to be selective, focusing 
on areas where they can leverage their expertise and learning abilities. Even though the QFII 
license requirements have been relaxed since the introduction of the scheme, the current 
requirements (e.g. $5 billion in assets under management) dictate that QFIIs are highly 
sophisticated global investors with an extensive ability to learn. 
Early studies on foreign institutional investment in other markets indicate that 
institutional investors tend to follow the same general investment patterns, regardless of the 
market (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Institutional investors 
prefer prudent investment choices such as large firms in established industries with low 
volatility. They dislike firms with concentrated ownership (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; 
Doidge et al., 2006). As an emerging market with high volatility and highly concentrated 
ownership, the Chinese market presents multiple challenges in implementing such principles. 
Our focus in this paper is on changes in investment behavior of foreign institutional 
investors in the Chinese equity market during our sample period of 2003 - 2014. Prior studies 
on determinants of QFII investment tend to either consider a pooled sample of QFII holdings 
over longer periods of time (Liu et al., 2014; Zou et al., 2016), or QFII investor effects and 
behaviors with respect to specific changes in the market (e.g. Huang and Zhu, 2015). However, 
considering changes in determinants of QFII investment over time allows us to observe how 
QFII investment behavior evolves along with Chinese equity markets and their increasing 
knowledge of the unique characteristics of those markets. Zhang et al. (2017), who study the 
network structure of QFII investments, attribute changes in that structure to the growing China-
expertise of QFIIs. In a similar vein, we posit that QFIIs adjust their investment behavior over 
time as they gain experience about the Chinese market and as the level and local expertise of 
financial analysis in China improves generally. 
Our main hypothesis here is that QFIIs gain expertise in the Chinese market over time, 
allowing them to become more China-specific in their investments. 
It is important to consider two major shifts in the regulatory environment during our 
sample period that might affect QFII preferences. First, the alignment of withholding tax rates 
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on dividends paid to foreign investors in 2008 increased the withholding tax faced by foreign 
institutions from zero to 10 %. The change simultaneously reduced uncertainty surrounding tax 
treatment of dividends. Second, the split-share structure reform of 2005 changed the role of 
state ownership in corporate governance by transferring the previously non-tradeable shares 
under state control to tradeable shares. The split-share structure reform was adopted on a firm-
by-firm basis with the government’s goal to complete the reform by the end of 2006 (Firth et 
al., 2010). While the split-share structure reform allowed sale of previously non-tradeable 
shares, reductions in state ownership were not common. However, the reform resulted in 
alignment of incentives between state-owners and private owners (Liao et al., 2014). The split-
share structure reform also had an indirect impact on dividends. Michaely and Qian (2017) find 
a liquidity shock caused by the split-share reform that increased dividend payouts of Chinese 
firms. 
We use quarterly data on QFII holdings to study foreign institutions’ preferences in the 
Chinese market during the time period from 2003 to 2014. Our holdings data from the Wind 
database is similar in structure to the 13f filings used in US studies on institutional ownership. 
By ending our sample in 2014, we avoid contamination from recent alternative methods to 
access the Chinese A-share market via the Shanghai – Hong Kong Connect arrangement in 
2014, the Shenzhen – Hong Kong Connect in 2016, and expansion of the Renmimbi Qualified 
Institutional Investor (RQFII) scheme from Hong Kong subsidiaries of Chinese institutions to 
a wider set of international institutions in 2014. 
Similar to prior studies on determinants of institutional ownership (e.g. Bennett et al., 
2003; Kang and Stulz, 1997), we analyze changes in institutional preferences over time by 
splitting our sample into sub-periods. In our main tests, we employ a diff-in-diff setting, where 
we contrast the investment behavior after 2008 against the time prior to 2009. We split our 
sample in the middle of our sample period in 2008 for several reasons. As noted, two significant 
regulatory changes occur around the middle of our sample period. Withholding taxation for 
foreign institutions was clarified in 2008, and by 2008, the split-share structure reform of 2005 
was completed by most firms (Firth et al., 2016). Firth, et al. (2016) further separate the effects 
of China’s bull market in China that ended in 2007, with a similar split of their data. Finally, 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, industry experts call for changes in the way institutions 
view international equity allocation. In this view, emerging markets need to have a more stable 
weighting in global portfolios (Kang et al., 2010). 
Consistent with the prediction of Choi et al. (2017) about concentrated holdings in an 
opaque market, we find that QFII holdings are limited to a tiny number of stocks. The average 
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number of different stocks in a QFII portfolio with A-share holdings varies between 7 and 22, 
with a decreasing trend over time. Regarding determinants of QFII holdings, we find that in 
the early half of our sample period, QFII investments follow some of the same patterns that are 
reported for foreign institutional investors in other markets. They avoid penny stocks and 
stocks with high volatility, preferring high momentum returns and stocks that are cross-listed 
in other markets. In our analysis of time-specific sub-samples, we document significant over-
time adjustments toward local market characteristics. After 2008, QFII behavior differs 
markedly from that reported in other markets. For instance, cross-listings are no longer an 
attraction, and volatility has a weak positive effect on holdings in the latter half of our sample. 
Interestingly, state ownership has a strong positive effect on QFII holdings, and QFIIs herd 
Chinese institutions after 2008. The finding on state ownership is somewhat surprising, as state 
ownership is often associated with weak incentive structures and poor monitoring (Megginson 
et al., 2014). QFII behavior becomes more China-specific in the latter half of our sample, 
suggesting that foreign institutions learned to adapt to the local market characteristics over time. 
The decreasing trend in the number of different investments in QFII portfolios is also consistent 
with the argument that as QFIIs come to understand China-specific risk factors they become 
better at focusing their investment strategies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides information on the Chinese QFII 
scheme and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the results of our 
regression analysis are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Institutional background and hypotheses development 
Since 2002, foreign institutional investors have been permitted to apply for an investment quota 
to invest in the Chinese A-share market through the QFII scheme. Applicants must meet the 
strict criteria set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). These criteria 
include capital requirements, business experience and assets under management. After the 
CSRC evaluates the application and grants QFII status, the State Administration for Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) allocates a specific quota to each approved QFII. Under the scheme, no QFII 
may hold more than 10 % of any company’s A-shares, and that the combined holdings of all 
QFII investors may not exceed 30 % of the total outstanding A-shares of any firm. 
From the initial aggregated quota of $424 million allocated to 10 foreign institutions in 
2003, the QFII scheme has grown to $93 billion, distributed across 248 institutions. Despite 
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the fast growth of the combined quota, it remains at barely 4 % of the total A-share market 
capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. As we note in the introduction, QFIIs 
seldom use their full quota allocation. Strict regulations on repatriation and asset allocation 
seem to play a role in limiting investment.2 During the sample period of our study, 2003–2014, 
the QFII scheme was the only means of access by foreign investors to the Chinese A-share 
market. Since 2014, the Connect programs between Shanghai- and Shenzhen exchanges and 
Hong Kong have allowed retail access to the A-share market, while the RQFII scheme, which 
originally allowed Hong Kong subsidiaries of Chinese institutions to trade in the A-share 
market, has been expanded to Hong Kong subsidiaries of institutions from other countries. By 
ending our sample in 2014, we are able to focus on the effects of the QFII program. 
Investors who wish to take advantage of the special characteristics of a foreign market 
need to develop expertise in local regulation and market characteristics. The special market 
characteristics play a very important role in China, as Allen et al. (2018) note that the models 
for economic growth in the country deviate significantly from the thoroughly-studied models 
in the developed markets. In their advertising, foreign institutions with QFII quotas tend to 
highlight the importance of local knowledge in the Chinese market. Already prior to opening 
of the Chinese A-share market to foreign institutional investors via the QFII scheme, Leung 
and Young (2002) predicted that local knowledge would play an important role for foreign 
institutions in China. However, deep knowledge and understanding of the Chinese corporate 
culture, paired with a high level of financial sophistication may have been a rare combination, 
especially in the early part of our sample period. For instance, the CFA institute reports that 
less than 10 CFA charters were annually awarded to China prior to 1999. Since then the annual 
average has risen to approximately 600. Furthermore, the brief history of the modern Chinese 
stock market makes quantitative analysis of the Chinese market challenging. 
Foreign institutions can generate benefits for both firms in the market and local 
investment professionals. In a World Bank report, Kim et al. (2003) stress the importance of 
Chinese institutional investment skills for the growth of the economy. They view foreign 
institutions as a conduit for importing investment analysis skills and developing the level of 
Chinese investment profession. Foreign institutions can also be effective monitors, and thus 
help Chinese firms improve their often-criticized problems with corporate governance. Bena 
et al. (2017) report this role of foreign institutional investors in their global sample, while 
                                                          
2 “Use it or lose it” regulations introduced in 2016 require QFIIs to be active. When a QFII fails to use 60–70 % 
of their quota within a year of approval, they risk loss of their qualified investor status. This was not the case 
during our sample period. 
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Huang and Zhu (2015) find that QFIIs have had a positive effect on corporate governance of 
Chinese firms during the implementation of the split-share structure reform as they were 
somewhat immune to the political influences in the country relative to their domestic 
counterparts. 
Concentrated ownership and heavy state presence are a special characteristic of the 
Chinese market. In a recent paper, Allen et al. (2018) report that government continues to retain 
a tight control of the Chinese corporations, through both direct ownership and politically-
motivated appointments. Understanding their effects on Chinese firms and their owners is 
essential for foreign investors in China. They may even be viewed as a local “abundant risk 
factor” that gives foreign institutions special incentive to study (Choi et al., 2017). Besides 
direct state ownership by both local and central government, legal person shares also serve to 
increase state presence in the ownership structure of Chinese firms. Delios and Wu (2005) 
report that government-related institutions own more than 80 % of all legal person shares, and 
Calomiris et al. (2010) argue that their role in corporate governance is very similar to 
government-owned shares. Legal person identity, as a policy measure, was created to channel 
the transformation of SOEs to private corporations. Nonetheless, the concentration of 
government-related institutions in legal person shares creates a perception of indirect state 
presence in firms. 
Concentrated ownership and government ownership are often linked to a lack of 
transparency, low disclosure quality, and an entrenchment effect. Fan et al. (2007) report that 
politically connected firms tend to underperform, while Chaney et al. (2011) find that they are 
opaque due to the poor quality of their accounting information. Examining eight East Asian 
countries, Claessens et al. (2002) find that, consistent with the entrenchment effect, deviation 
between control rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder diminishes firm value.  
Xu and Wang (1999) suggest that ownership concentration improves performance of Chinese 
firms, but that state ownership has an inverse effect. State presence can lead to politically 
motivated election of the CEO (Fan et.al, 2007), or other forms of government interference that 
reduce operating performance (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
These practices, along with reduced information transparency, make it more challenging 
for foreign investors to analyze state-controlled firms. In a recent paper, Firth et al. (2016) 
study the effects of mutual fund ownership on the dividend policies of Chinese firms. They 
find that mutual funds affect corporate decision-making through the exit threat they pose, and 
that their effect on corporate governance may substitute for the shortcomings posed by 
government ownership. 
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However, investing in firms with higher ownership concentration and state presence may 
also function as a mechanism to safeguard investments in China. Politically linked firms often 
enjoy favorable treatment by the government and state banks. Wang et al. (2008) suggest that 
these benefits may come in the form of lower cost for debt, financial support, and bailouts 
during periods of financial distress. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986), concentrated 
ownership by legal persons also confers monitoring benefits that enhance firm performance 
(Xu and Wang, 1999; Sun and Tong, 2003). Furthermore, it may be easier for QFIIs to deal 
with a limited number of concentrated owners, even if they are state bureaus. Concentration 
among few owners and bureaus, in turn, may be helpful to QFIIs in accumulating reliable 
information. Calomiris et al. (2010) find that sales of government-owned shares tend to 
generate negative announcement returns in China. Their findings suggest that political ties 
provide benefits that offset any detrimental value effects of government ownership.  
As we observe quarterly QFII holdings from the scheme’s early days through a period of 
expansion of both the scheme and the Chinese market, we expect to see significant changes in 
the investment behavior of foreign institutions in China. In our analysis, we follow closely the 
empirical models that previous studies by Kang and Stulz (1999), Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001), and Gompers and Metrick (2001) created to describe institutional investment. Our main 
hypothesis is that the preferences of institutional investors evolve toward China-specific 
determinants as they accrue specific expertise related to the Chinese market and its special 
characteristics. 
 
H1: China-specific determinants of foreign institutional investment are more relevant in 
the latter half of our sample. 
 
Our second hypothesis stems from the theoretical work of Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2009) and empirical findings of Choi et al. (2017). Their intuition is that, foreign 
institutional investors follow highly concentrated research strategies in an opaque market, 
focusing on select abundant risk factors. Such concentration entails a deviation from the 
traditional portfolio theory. Its goal is to generate pockets of comparative advantage, based on 
global expertise and a strong ability to learn. Since such strategy also requires high-level 
sophistication related to local market characteristics, we thus hypothesize that concentration of 
investment increases over time. 
 8 
H2: QFII investments in the Chinese A-share market are more concentrated in the latter 
half of our sample. 
 
 
3. Data  
3.1 QFII holdings data 
We obtain quarterly holdings for each foreign institutional investor in the Chinese A-share 
market from the Wind database. Our sample includes all QFII holdings from the fourth quarter 
of 2003 to the end of 2014, for a total of 45 quarters. With quarterly holdings data, our dataset 
is comparable to the 13f filings data used in studies on US institutional investment. Each record 
includes the total volume, market valuation, and the percentage of tradable shares held by the 
QFII at the end of that quarter. For instance, in 2008Q2, QFII Citibank held 71,850,806 shares 
in Vanke A (000002.SZ) with a market valuation of these shares of RMB 647,370,000, or 0.76 % 
of the total tradable shares of Vanke A. 
Figure 1 provides information regarding the A-share portfolios of QFIIs. The number of 
QFIIs with A-share investments rises during our sample period from 3 to 82. The percentage 
of Chinese firms with QFII investments also initially rises rapidly from less than 2% in 2003 
to over 26% in 2007. Thereafter, the percentage declines. Some of this decline reflects the 
steady increase in the number of listed firms in China. Figure 1 also indicates that QFIIs have 
become more focused in their equity investments over time, despite the increase in investment 
opportunities.3 Starting in 2011, the average number of different shares in portfolios of QFIIs 
holds steadily at around seven. Given the total number of listed companies exceeded 2,000 
during this period, it is clear that QFIIs are highly selective in their investment decisions, a 
finding consistent with Choi et al. (2017). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3.2 Distribution of QFIIs among countries and categories 
We utilize the CSRC classification of QFIIs into the following categories: 1) asset management 
company, 2) insurance company, 3) security company, 4) commercial bank, and 5) others. The 
category “others” includes pension funds, sovereign funds, university endowments, and trust 
                                                          
3 Wang (2014) reports a decline in the total number of companies with QFII investment status. 
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funds. We also group QFIIs by their nationalities and regions. Some QFIIs such as Credit 
Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited or UBS Global Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd are obvious 
branches or subsidiaries of their parent company. For these QFIIs, we use Capital IQ to trace 
each parent company’s country location to identify the QFII’s original nationality.4 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows the distribution of QFIIs across categories and countries. Our sample 
includes 114 QFIIs. Among them are 53 asset management companies, 6 insurance companies, 
9 security companies, 26 commercial banks, and 20 institutions classified as “others”. 5 These 
QFIIs represent 19 countries. Among them, the US has the largest number of QFIIs (23), 
followed by Hong Kong (16), the UK (12), Japan (10), and Singapore (10). We further group 
countries into three regions: Anglo-Saxon countries, Europe, and Asia. 56 QFIIs are from Asia, 
while 40 and 18 of them are from Anglo-Saxon countries and Europe, respectively. 
 
3.3 Variable description 
We calculate the total foreign institutional holdings in a particular stock by aggregating the 
percentage ownership of QFIIs in that firm in each quarter. Foreign institutional ownership for 
a specific stock i, FOWNi, is defined as 
 
 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑚 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 , (1) 
where the summation for each quarter is operated across holdings of M number of QFIIs in 
stock i. Subsequently, we assign the quarterly FOWN measure to each stock as calculated from 
above. Firms with null FOWN in the quarter are assigned a value of zero. We collect firm 
characteristics and stock prices for all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. In our regression tests, we exclude financial firms (CSRC industry code=J) due to 
their different accounting standards. Our stock return data come from Wind database, and our 
accounting data are from RESSET. 
To facilitate comparisons with institutional investment patterns reported from other 
markets, we closely follow the work of Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
                                                          
4 Both Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited and UBS Global Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd are regarded as 
QFIIs from Switzerland. 
5 Our sample only includes QFIIs with investments in the A-share market. A number of foreign institutions with 
QFII licenses had no holdings in the A-share market during our sample period. 
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and Gompers and Metrick (2001) in our choice of independent variables. See Appendix A for 
the variables and their definitions. We also provide the summary statistics for all A-shares 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges in Table 2. Panel A reports statistics for the 
full sample period. In Panel B, we divide the sample so that the first part contains the period 
2003Q4–2008Q4 and the second half covers the period of 2009Q1–2014Q4. 
Panel A of Table 2 reveals that foreign institutions in the overall sample held only 0.181 % 
of a firm’s tradable A-shares. However, the maximum ownership of QFIIs in a firm exceeds 
27 %.6 The average listing history of the firm is less than 8.5 years, highlighting the brevity of 
the history of capital market development in China. The average dividend yield (0.7 %) for the 
Chinese firms is substantially lower than the corresponding dividend yield in the US (2.21%). 
This may suggest expropriation of outside/minority shareholders by controlling shareholders 
in Chinese listed firms. (see e.g. Faccio et al., 2001). Of the total, 9.5 % of firms are part of the 
two indices represented by the S180_dum, while 3 % of the firms are cross-listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange.7 On average, state ownership and 
legal person ownership represent 13.6 % and 14.5 % of the shares in issue, respectively. The 
average leverage for a Chinese firm is 44 %, which is almost twice that reported in Ferreira 
and Matos (2008) for the sample of firms across 27 counties. Our sample period matches that 
used by Zou et al. (2016), who contrast QFII holdings to those by domestic mutual funds in a 
pooled setting. Our descriptive statistics are largely similar to those of Zou et al. (2016), but 
several marked differences deserve mention. Their average firm age is significantly greater 
than what we indicate in Table 2. The likely reason is that we measure firm age from stock 
listing. We view the firm history prior to stock listing having less relevance in China due to 
underdeveloped legal infrastructure and accounting norms. Some other differences between 
our findings and those in Zou et al. (2016) may be attributable to differences in data sources. 
By using the Wind database for holdings and stock returns, we rely on an established and well-
utilized data source that is used widely by both academics and practitioners. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As we are interested in changes in QFII behavior over time, we observe how the 
descriptive statistics change between the early and the late half of our sample period. Panel B 
of Table 2 indicates that, with the fast growth of the market, the percentage ownership by QFIIs 
                                                          
6 Recall that the regulatory upper limit for combined QFII holdings in a firm is 30 %. 
7 Ferreira and Matos (2008) report that 3.9 % of their global sample firms are cross-listed in the US alone. 
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(FOWN) and government ownership (stateown and legal person own) decreases between the 
early and the late sub-periods. The significant drop in state ownership is explained both by new 
entrepreneurial firms entering the market and, to some extent, by privatization efforts of the 
Chinese government. Domestic institutions increase their average holdings from 12.1 % to 
15.0 % (domestic_inst_lag), while the percentage of cross-listed shares increases slightly. 
Notably, despite the large number of new entrants to the market, the average market cap has 
almost doubles from the early half to the latter half of our sample period. 
 
3.4 Difference in means test 
In Table 3, we report a comparison of summary statistics between firms with foreign investors 
(FOWN>0) and those with only domestic investors (FOWN=0), along with the t-statistic for 
the difference in means. Most of the differences between the two groups are statistically 
different from zero at the one percent level of significance, suggesting that QFIIs and domestic 
investors pay attention to different characteristics. 
Firms with foreign ownership have significantly higher market capitalization, dividend 
yield, share price, share turnover, lagged returns, leverage, ROA, and lagged domestic 
institutional ownership. In comparison to domestic investors, foreign investors also exhibit a 
greater preference for firms with concentrated ownership and firms with greater state 
ownership. QFIIs appear to dislike firms with high volatility, and low current ratio.8 Legal 
person ownership is lower in firms with QFII ownership. While 22 % of the QFII portfolio 
stocks belong to the S180 index, the comparable figure for firms not held by QFIIs is just 8.4 %. 
The results in Table 3 are by large consistent with previous findings from other markets, which 
suggest that international institutional investors are momentum investors who prefer prudent 
characteristics and liquidity (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                          
8 Current ratio is used by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) as a proxy for short-term financial distress. It is a 
relevant measure of financial concerns in the Chinese setting. Megginson et al. (2014) report that Chinese firms 
tend to hold cash in response to potential financial constraints arising from deteriorating connections to state-
owned banks. 
 12 
3.5 Decile descriptive statistics for firms with positive FOWN  
To highlight the differences within the QFII-held sample for the firm-specific preferences, we 
divide the sample of firms with positive foreign ownership into 10 equal percentiles in Table 
4. The deciles show increasing in foreign ownership such that D1 is the decile with least QFII 
ownership and D10 is the decile with the most foreign ownership. Note that Table 4 includes 
only firms with QFII ownership. While Table 3 indicates that large size attracts foreign 
investors, Table 4 shows that, among firms with foreign ownership, the percentage of foreign 
ownership is actually larger in smaller firms. QFII ownership is also tilted toward younger 
(AGE) firms with lower book to market (BM). These findings starkly contrast with previous 
findings from other markets. QFII holdings are higher in stocks with higher lagged returns, 
which is consistent with the momentum investing pattern documented in other markets. 
Perhaps the most surprising monotonic increases across FOWN deciles are in state ownership 
and legal person ownership. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3.6 Increased focus of QFII investments 
Hypothesis 2 implies that QFII investments become more focused over time. Recall that Figure 
1 shows that the number of different A-shares in an average QFII portfolio has declined during 
our sample period. To further observe the level of concentration within QFII portfolios, we 
calculate the value of individual QFII investments for each institution. Figure 2 indicates that 
the decline in the number of different shares has been accompanied by a significant increase in 
the average RMB-value of each stock investment.9 The t-statistic for comparison of average 
investment size between the early and late sub-periods is 7.99. This suggests a significant 
increase in the focus of QFII investments, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
When we further observe QFII investments concentration across industries (CSRC 
definition), we find statistically significant increases in concentration in four sectors: Financial, 
Manufacturing, Accommodation & Catering, and Real Estate (untabulated). Kang and Stulz 
                                                          
9 Figure 2 is based on 2014 RMB values. 
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(1997) report that foreign institutions in the Japanese market are also drawn to the 
manufacturing sector. Liu et al. (2014) classify the Real Estate sector in China as one requiring 
specific local knowledge. We argue that same can be said about the Financial sector in China, 
due to heavy influence of the government, both as a regulator and an owner, in that industry. It 
therefore appears that the increase in concentration of QFII investments is linked to industries 
requiring local knowledge. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
 
4. Regression analysis 
4.1 Methodology 
As Figure 1 indicates, foreign institutional investors invested only in a tiny sub-set of the 
Chinese A-share market, so the resulting large proportion of zeros in firm-level holdings data 
deserves some attention. A number of previous studies on international institutional investment 
tackle this issue implicitly by defining their measure of institutional investment in firm x as 
deviation from the market value weight of that firm (e.g. Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Kang 
and Stulz, 1997). In our view, this variable poorly suited to the Chinese setting as market 
weights may not be a good benchmark for an emerging market such as China. As our purpose 
is to elucidate the determinants of QFII investment decisions, we argue that a non-zero 
investment in a Chinese firm is a better reflection of QFII investment decisions than their 
choices to deviate from the market weights of individual Chinese firms, which forces us to deal 
with the clustering of QFII holdings at zero. 
Tobit models are often used in cases when data are truncated at zero. However, such 
models assume that the underlying process follows the normal distribution even if the data are 
observationally truncated (Cook et al., 2008). This assumption does not hold with proportional 
data that is by definition censored at zero (and one). In our setting, the ratio of combined QFII 
holdings over shares outstanding can hardly take negative values, especially since shorting of 
Chinese A-shares was not allowed prior to 2006 and remained complicated after that (Carpenter 
et al., 2018).10 
From the estimation standpoint, the problem is that the decision by the investor to invest 
a non-zero amount may be based on a process that is different from the process that determines 
the amount of investment once the decision to invest has been made. This sequence is supported 
                                                          
10 For instance, retail investors hold approximately 80 % of the market. This significantly constrains the supply of 
available shares to borrow. 
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by the finding of Choi et al. (2017) that institutional investors tend to focus their investments 
in an emerging market on narrow areas where they can expect to have a comparative advantage 
over domestic investors. Also, a comparison between Tables 3 and 4 suggests that the decision 
whether to invest in a Chinese A-share is driven by characteristics that are different from those 
determining the extent of the investment. In such situations, a zero-inflated beta model is 
appropriate. Following Cook et al. (2008), we specify a zero-inflated beta model that applies a 
logistic regression model for whether the proportional variable equals zero or not, and a two-
parameter beta model for any values between zero and one.11 In our setting, the model is set to 
explain deviations from zero, and values between zero and one, for tiFOWN , , which is the 
aggregated holdings in stock i by all the QFIIs in quarter t. While the zero-inflated beta model 
is more appropriate to our setting, a tobit model yields results that are qualitatively quite similar 
to those we report in our regression tables. 
For robustness, we consider the alternative method mentioned above, whereby we 
measure QFII holdings in stock i in relation to stock i’s relative market weight in the Chinese 
stock market in quarter t. 
 
4.2 Stock preferences of QFIIs for the full period and sub periods 
After we examine the stock preferences of QFIIs for our entire sample period, we divide the 
sample into two sub-periods to examine whether QFII preferences shift over time. In essence, 
we follow prior studies such as Bennett et al. (2003), who study the preferences of US 
institutional investors in time-specific sub-periods, reporting changes in those preferences over 
time,12 as well as Kang and Stulz (1997), who study foreign institutional holdings in the 
Japanese market separately for the 1976–1983 and 1984–1991 sub-periods. 
Table 5 illustrates regression results for full sample period and for early and late halves 
of our sample, respectively. While the results on some of the determinants of foreign 
investment are consistent with prior studies, it is clear that the investment behavior of foreign 
institutions in China differs from other markets. For our full sample period, foreign institutional 
investors exhibit strong preferences for high book-to-market firms, firms that are cross-listed 
abroad, and firms with less financial concerns, as reflected by the coefficient for Current ratio. 
While these findings align with existing literature on foreign institutional investment in other 
                                                          
11 Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) motivate the use of the two-parameter beta distribution in a regression model 
with the variable of interest restricted to (0,1). In addition to their work, see Cook et al. (2008) for details on the 
zero-inflated beta model. 
12 Bennett et al. (2003) split their quarterly sample from 1983 to 1997 into two sub-periods of 30 quarters each. 
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markets, some of the additional comparisons between prior studies and evidence from China 
may suffer from the uniqueness of the Chinese market. For example, the Chinese A-share 
market is characterized by extremely high trading activity (Liao et al., 2014; Chui and Titman, 
2017), which may be off-putting to QFIIs, even if they typically prefer highly liquid stocks. 
Similarly, Chui and Titman (2017) find that the momentum effect commonly found in other 
markets does not exist in the Chinese A-share market. Thus, our finding that QFIIs appear to 
be momentum investors, with a tilt toward firms with high previous quarter returns (RETt-3,t), 
may actually reflect preferences that deviate from those reported in studies of foreign 
institutional investment in other markets. 
In contrast to prudent investment characteristics reported for other markets, institutions 
investing under the QFII scheme not only seek low turnover, but firms that relatively small. 
Prior studies on institutional investment report a strong and consistent institutional preference 
for liquidity and large firms (e.g. Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). 
Consistent with Doigde et al. (2006), and Ferreira and Matos (2008), the QFII investors avoid 
firms with concentrated ownership as measured by our H5 variable. Furthermore, consistent 
with US findings, QFIIs exhibit a perhaps surprisingly strong preference for firms with higher 
stock price. QFII investors also appear to prefer firms with government ownership. Consistent 
with the results reported in Liu et al. (2014), QFIIs prefer firms with higher state ownership 
and higher legal person ownership; both variables enter with very strong positive coefficients. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Results for the sub-periods are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. We observe a 
clear shift in QFII preferences over time. Many of the relations mentioned above are present 
only in either the first or the second half of our sample period. The only variables with 
consistent and statistically significant coefficients in both sub-periods are TURN and PRC. In 
other words, regardless of time period, QFIIs prefer shares with low liquidity and high share 
price. Some of the consistencies between our findings and those of earlier studies on foreign 
institutional investment in other markets are only present in the first sub-period. For instance, 
QFIIs prefer cross-listed shares and shares with high momentum returns only during the first 
half of our sample period. Overall, it appears that QFIIs have adjusted their investment 
behavior (a potential outcome of their learning) to focus on specific local factors during the 
latter period. This, too, is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
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The coefficient on lagged holdings for domestic institutions is negative and significant 
in the first sub-period, but positive and significant in the second sub-period. This can be 
explained either in terms of institutional learning that leads QFII investments to follow the 
patterns used by local institutions, or in terms of local institutions gaining sophistication over 
time, making the coefficient on lagged holdings for domestic institutions a valid benchmark 
for QFII portfolios. The preference for firms with state and legal person ownership is driven 
by the more recent sub-period. These results suggest that after the initial investment experience 
in the Chinese stock market in the first period, QFIIs obtain local knowledge and modify their 
investment behavior accordingly in the second period.13 Evidence in Calomiris et al. (2010) 
suggests that government ownership provides benefits that outweigh the potential costs of 
government interference in firm management. Huang and Zhu (2015) report that QFIIs may 
combine their efforts with state ownership to affect corporate governance. This provides QFIIs 
with yet another motive for holding stocks with government ownership, and is consistent with 
QFIIs learning China-specific investment patterns over time. 
 
4.3 Evidence from difference-in-differences 
As our focus is on changes in QFII behavior over time, we next observe them next in a diff-in-
diff setting, as indicated in Equation (2). 
 
 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ (𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑡  ×  𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) + 𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 , (2) 
 
where post2008 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for the time period after 
2008, and Xi,j,t is a vector of j determinants of foreign institutional investment, as suggested by 
prior studies, that we use in Table 5. Our main interest is in the δi,j -coefficients as any 
significant coefficients will indicate a shift in investment preferences of the QFIIs. For the sake 
of brevity, we only report the coefficients of those interactions in Table 6. We continue to use 
the zero-inflated beta regression as our test method. 
As suggested by Table 5, the determinants of QFII holdings experience a significant shift 
between the earlier and the latter parts of our sample period. The first column of Table 6 
indicates that QFIIs exhibit a stronger preference for larger firms with greater book-to-market, 
                                                          
13 We also estimated alphas for the QFII portfolios in our sample. While they are not significantly different from 
zero in either sub-period, they shift from weakly negative to positive, and the shift is statistically significant. 
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turnover, stock price, and current ratio in the period after 2008. Relative to the early part of our 
sample, they also show a stronger dislike for concentrated ownership as measured by our H5 
variable. All these findings suggest a move towards more prudent investment, in line with 
earlier findings regarding institutional investment in other markets. However, QFIIs also 
become less interested in momentum returns and are significantly more attracted to 
government-owned firms as indicated by coefficients for both Stateown ×  post2008 and 
Legalown ×  post2008. Lagged holdings of Chinese domestic institutions also have a 
significantly stronger positive effect on QFII holdings after 2008. 
Given the growing number of foreign institutions throughout our sample period (Figure 
1), differences in the QFII behavior between the early and the late periods could potentially be 
explained by new QFII entrants with different preferences. In column (2) of Table 6, we re-
estimate the model in Equation (2) with FOWNi,t capturing only those QFIIs present in both 
halves of our sample. As column (2) of Table 6 shows, changes in the group of QFIIs that are 
more mature in the Chinese market mirror closely those changes we report for the full sample 
of QFIIs in column (1) of Table 6. In column (3) of Table 6, we further consider whether 
changes in the corporate population between the early and the late periods of our sample drive 
our results as the number of listed firms in the Chinese market climbed steadily during our 
sample period. The tests reported in column (6) of Table only include holdings in those firms 
listed prior to 2009. Again, differences between column (3) and the earlier columns of Table 6 
are minimal. The only marked difference is on the coefficient for AGE × post2008, which is 
no longer statistically significant in this setting. This finding suggests that our earlier results 
regarding the negative coefficient on AGE are partially explained by firms listed after 2009 that 
attracted QFII attention. 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) report that foreign institutional holdings in Sweden are, 
to a large extent, driven by US institutions and their investment patterns. As Table 1 indicates, 
roughly 20 % of the QFIIs come from the US. Our (untabulated) tests at the institutions’ home 
country level suggest that some of the changes we report in Table 6 are not present in the sub-
sample of US institutions. While US institutions also exhibit an increased preference for firms 
with state ownership and legal person ownership in the latter period, their preference does not 
change between the early and the late periods regarding BM, VOL, PRC, or H5.  Interestingly, 
the US institutions are not attracted by domestic mutual funds in either sub-period, and their 
preference for smaller firms (as measured by MKTCAP) increases significantly, which is 
opposite to the reaction in the full sample. 
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As noted above, we also use an alternative methodology that measures QFII investments 
in a stock as deviation from that stock’s market weight in the Chinese stock market. We 
continue to use the diff-in-diff setting described in Equation (2), applying the OLS method this 
time as this metric does not suffer from clustering at zero. The untabulated results suggest, as 
expected, that it is more challenging to capture determinants of QFII investment decisions with 
this methodology as market weight may not be a valid benchmark for foreign investors in the 
Chinese market. Among the variables showing significant shifts in Column (1) of Table 6, only 
Domestic_inst_lag, Legalown, PRC, and BM behave in a consistent manner, while most 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. The R2 of the regression is only 0.007. 
 
4.4 QFII preferences and international risk environment 
The sample period covers a turbulent time period. After the Chinese stock market plunged in 
February 2007, the global recession in 2007–2009 ensued. In this sub-section, we consider 
whether changes in risk level affected foreign institutions’ investment patterns in China. As a 
shift by QFIIs to firms with state ownership is one of the most persistent results we report, we 
are particularly interested in testing whether the growing attraction for state-owned firms is 
driven by increased risk levels during the financial crisis. Governments are expected to 
intervene during times of market turbulence, but the intervention may be beneficial or 
detrimental to other stockholders. A bailout of a troubled firm is positive, which would make 
it more attractive to hold government-owned firms during a period of market turbulence. If, 
however, the government’s expected reaction to turbulence is nationalization or other forms of 
appropriation of other shareholders’ rights, the effect would be negative. 
We first introduce a dummy variable to proxy for changing global business conditions. 
It takes a value of one if the quarter belongs to period from 2007Q4–2009Q2, and zero 
otherwise. We continue to use the diff-in-diff methodology of Equation (2), and note that our 
definition of the crisis period captures the last five quarters of our early sub-sample and the 
first two quarters of the latter sub-sample. The results of this estimation are reported in the first 
column of Table 7. The interesting part of the analysis in column (1) of Table 7 relates to the 
triple interaction variable between post2008, state ownership, and crisis. The coefficient for 
that interaction enters with a weak negative sign. This suggests that uncertainty during the crisis 
period fails to explain our finding that QFIIs increase their investments in firms with state 
ownership in the latter half of our sample period. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We repeat the above exercise using the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
volatility index, commonly known as the VIX, as an alternative proxy for the global risk 
environment. The estimations using the quarterly volatility expectations are presented in the 
second column of Table 7. The triple interaction between post2008, state ownership and VIX 
has a negative effect on the QFII investment, which further suggests that interest among QFIIs 
for firms with state ownership is not based on the safety of government backing of those firms 
during times of uncertainty. 
 
4.5 Regulatory changes and changes in QFII preferences 
As noted, the rapid growth of the Chinese market was paralleled by changes in the regulatory 
infrastructure. The literature identifies two significant reforms with potential effects on the 
determinants of QFII investment choices that occur in our sample period. These reforms could 
play an important role in the shift in QFII preferences that we observe in Tables 5 and 6. 
China issued a new regulation in 2008 regarding taxation of foreign investors. It set the 
withholding tax rate for dividends paid to foreign-owned entities at 10 %, in comparison to the 
zero percent rate in effect prior to the reform. It also clarified issues related to capital gains 
taxation of QFIIs (although many questions in that area remain). 14  It also provided tax 
incentives for QFIIs to locate their analytical activity in China, increasing, at least indirectly, 
the effect of local expertise in management of QFII portfolios. However, our results in Table 6 
suggest that the effect of the change in dividend tax withholding rate had no marked effect on 
QFII preferences. The coefficient on post2008 × DIV is not statistically significant, suggesting 
that QFIIs did not alter their holdings based on the regulation on withholding taxation of 
dividends. This non-finding also suggests that the increase in dividends in conjunction with the 
split-share structure reform reported by Michaely and Qian (2017) had no impact on QFII 
preferences. 
The split-share structure reform, launched in 2005, is another significant regulatory 
change with implications for QFIIs. With the reform, state-owned shares and legal person 
shares became tradeable. In each company, holders of these previously non-tradeable shares 
were supposed to negotiate the amount of compensation with the holders of the firm’s tradeable 
shares as those holders would suffer dilution. The government hoped to complete the reform 
                                                          
14 For more information on the effects of the tax reform, see PwC (2014). 
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by the end of 2006. Indeed, 1,302 firms had completed the reform already in January 2006 
(Firth et al., 2010). Huang and Zhu (2015) examine how QFII ownership of tradeable shares 
affected the progress of the reform at firms. They find that presence of institutional ownership 
(both foreign and domestic) sped up the process.15 They further report that QFII ownership had 
a positive effect on the value of the deal to the holders of tradeable A-shares. Their findings 
suggest that political ties between firms and Chinese institutions tipped the balance in 
negotiations toward the interests of firms. Foreign institutional owners and (state) owners of 
previously non-tradeable shares could not exert such power. However, Liao et al. (2014) find 
that related-party transactions continue to be common in firms with state ownership even after 
the split-share structure reform, and they question the reform’s effects on corporate governance. 
It is possible that the split-share structure reform accounts in part for our finding that 
QFIIs are more drawn to state-owned firms in the latter half of our sample. However, when we 
re-estimate the specification used in the first column of Table 5 separately for each year of our 
sample, we note that the preference for state ownership and legal person ownership reaches the 
conventional levels of statistical significance only from 2008 onwards (untabulated). Since the 
split-share structure reform was to a large extent completed by the beginning of 2006, it appears 
that while Huang and Zhu (2015) find that QFIIs played an important corporate governance 
role in state-owned firms during the split-share structure reform, the split-share structure reform 
had no immediate effect on QFII investment decisions. The annual regressions also reveal that 
the strong preference for state and legal ownership persists throughout the latter half of our 
sample period, reducing the concern that QFIIs would have increased their holdings around the 
split-share structure reform only to extract benefits from the negotiation process. 
 
4.5 The effect of central versus local government ownership on QFII preferences 
Government ownership comes with benefits and disadvantages. Political connections can 
provide the firm with a valuable access to subventions and financing from state-owned banks, 
but they can also lead to expropriation due to corrupt officials (Fan et al., 2007; Sun and Tong, 
2003; Chaney et al., 2011). Wang, et al. (2008) also report that, in contrast to Chinese firms 
owned by the central government, local-government SOEs tend to use smaller local auditing 
firms. This likely reduces the transparency of firms under local government power. Cheung et 
                                                          
15 Li et al. (2011) find that greater state ownership of non-tradeable shares leads to greater compensation to the 
holders of A-shares. They attribute this to the government’s incentive to complete reforms quickly without 
disturbing the stock market. 
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al (2010) also report significant differences between firms that have influence from local 
governments and those with central government involvement. They find that shareholders 
benefit from investing in firms that are either controlled by central government or have 
directors affiliated with the central government. 
To further study the role of government ownership in attracting QFII investments, we 
define an indicator variable Central_govt for firms that have the central government as the 
controlling shareholder as indicated by the CSMAR database on corporate ownership. The 
indicator variable takes the value of one for firms that have a firm or an institution owned by 
the central government as their controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. While our entire 
sample has 915 firms with state ownership greater than zero, 290 of those firms have the value 
of Central_govt equal to one. 
We include Central_govt in our main diff-in-diff specification from Table 6, and report 
the results regarding ownership variables in Table 8. Again, other controls and interactions are 
included in the regressions but omitted from the table for the sake of brevity. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Table 6 finding of increased QFII investments in firms with state-owned firms 
appears to be driven mainly by firms that are not controlled by central government. The 
coefficient on the triple interaction term Central_govt × Stateown× post2008 is negative and 
statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Given that Wang, et al. (2008) report reduced transparency for firms owned by local 
governmental entities, our Table 8 evidence provides further support for the suggestion that 
foreign institutional investors have found new alternative ways to overcome opacity issues in 
the Chinese market during our more recent sub-sample. Our result is also interesting in light of 
Cheung et al. (2010) finding that local government ownership expropriates value from minority 
shareholders. It should be noted that in their paper, the sample period is limited to 2001–2002. 
Also, they only consider short term event study evidence in conjunction with related party 
transactions. It is possible that the reported expropriation by the local government is more 





July 9, 2003 saw the first transaction by a QFII (UBS AG) on the Chinese A-share market. The 
QFII scheme subsequently developed rapidly, and today QFIIs play an important role in 
Chinese capital markets. In this paper, we employed a comprehensive data set to examine the 
determinants of their holdings. Our focus was on development of QFII over time as Chinese 
equity markets and international institutional investors gained experience. 
We document several similarities between QFII investment behavior and that reported in 
prior studies on institutional investment in developed markets. QFIIs are drawn to firms with 
prudent characteristics and firms that are cross-listed in other markets. In contrast to evidence 
from other markets, QFIIs operating in China prefer small firms with low stock turnover. They 
also show a preference for state-owned firms, a finding that might seem counterintuitive 
without an understanding of the unique features of the Chinese market. 
We further find that QFII investment was always quite narrowly targeted, and that the 
level of concentration of investments only has increased over time. The average A-share 
portfolio of a QFII investor includes less than 10 of the more than 2,000 listed Chinese 
companies, and more than half of the firms listed in the Chinese A-share market have no QFII 
investments. Meanwhile, the average value of individual QFII share investments increased 
significantly during our sample period. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, 
in an opaque market, foreign institutions aim for competitive advantages in narrowly defined 
areas and risk factors. Thus, they pursue highly concentrated investment strategies. 
Perhaps the most interesting result is that QFIIs appear to have identified certain China-
specific key variables to redesign their investment strategy in the course of our sample period. 
In particular, QFIIs have tilted their investments toward firms with high volatility and firms 
with high degrees of state ownership. Our evidence suggests that they have also begun to follow 
Chinese mutual fund investments more closely, and herd after them. We interpret these changes 
as evidence of institutional learning that has allowed QFIIs to take local Chinese characteristics 
into account in their investment decisions. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
FOWN Percentage of shareholdings of all QFIIs in a firm’s tradeable shares. Measured 
quarterly (see Equation 1).  
AGE Firm age calculated as the number of months since first-day return appears in 
Wind database. In regressions, we use the natural logarithm of the variable. 
DIV Dividend yield calculated as cash dividend divided by closing share price, log-
transformed for our regression analysis. 
BM Book-to-market ratio, i.e. book value of total assets divided by market 
capitalization, both measured at the end of the calendar year prior to the quarterly 
observation, logged for regression analysis. 
PRC Closing share price. The natural logarithm is used in regressions. 
TURN Average monthly turnover during the most recent three months, logged for 
regression analysis. 
VOL Stock return volatility estimated as the standard deviation of monthly returns over 
the previous year. Unlike the studies of Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Yan 
and Zhang (2007) which use two years, we use a one-year period to preserve 
sample size). 
RETt-3,t  Cumulative gross return over the past three months. 
RETt-12,t-3  Cumulative gross return over the nine months preceding the beginning of the 
filing quarter. 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. 
Current ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
ROA Return on assets calculated as net income divided by the book value of total 
assets. 
MKTCAP Market capitalization calculated as the closing share price, multiplied by total 
shares outstanding, and logged for regression analysis. 
Crosslisting_dum Dummy variable that equals one if stock is cross-listed on an exchange outside 
mainland China. The cross-listed shares in our sample are foreign listings on 
either the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) or New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).  
S180_dum Dummy variable that equals one if the stock is included on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 180 (SSE180) Index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Component 
(SICOM) Index. Both indices select firms based on market capitalization, 
profitability, liquidity, and market position within its branch.  
Domestic_inst_lag One quarter lag of domestic institutional ownership. 
H5 Herfindal 5 index, an indicator of ownership concentration calculated as the sum 
of squared ownership proportions held by each of the top five shareholders. 
State own Proportion of state-held shares at the end of each quarter.  
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Figure 1. QFII holdings relative to the A-share market. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average size of individual A-share investments by QFIIs. 
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Australia 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1 0 0 1 2 4 
France 2 0 0 4 0 6 
Germany 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Hong Kong 13 1 1 1 0 16 
Japan 5 1 4 0 0 10 
Korea 1 0 0 2 3 6 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Macau 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Netherlands 1 0 0 3 0 4 
Norway 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Singapore 5 0 0 3 2 10 
Switzerland 2 0 0 2 1 5 
Taiwan 0 4 4 0 0 8 
UAE 0 0 0 0 1 1 
UK 9 0 0 3 0 12 
US 12 0 0 6 5 23 
Total 53 6 9 26 20 114 
       
Anglo-Saxon 23 0 0 10 7 40 
Europe 6 0 0 10 2 18 
Asia 24 6 9 6 11 56 
 
 
This table shows the distribution of QFIIs by categories and countries. Our sample period is from 2003Q4 to 
2014Q4. We group the QFIIs into five categories namely, 1-asset management companies, 2-insurance 
companies, 3-security companies, 4-commercial banks and 5- others. All the QFIIs are further divided into three 
regions. The Anglo-Saxon countries include Australia, Canada, UK and US, Europe includes France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, and Asia includes Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Macau, Malaysia, 
Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan, and UAE. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample 
N = 71,503 mean median S.D. min max 
FOWN (%) 0.181 0 0.941 0 27.29 
BM 1.078 0.715 1.216 0.075 11.035 
MKTCAP (mil, RMB) 7970 3040 49500 9.23 5670000 
VOL 0.068 0.060 0.042 0.0001 0.252 
TURN 0.194 0.096 0.235 0.0006 2.534 
PRC (RMB) 12.29 8.89 12.293 0.48 273.99 
AGE (month) 98.92 97 68.82 1 286 
DIV 0.007 0.002 0.010 0 0.272 
RETt-3,t 0.008 0 0.130 -0.322 0.449 
RETt-12,t-3 0.015 0 0.236 -0.565 0.756 
S180_dum 0.095 0 0.293 0 1 
Crosslisting_dum 0.03 0 0.170 0 1 
Stateown 0.136 0 0.216 0 0.743 
Leverage 0.440 0.450 0.269 0.002 1.755 
Current ratio 0.024 0.014 0.032 0.002 0.230 
H5 0.180 0.151 0.124 0.013 0.582 
Legal person own 0.145 0.0003 0.221 0 0.75 
ROA 0.019 0.013 0.038 -0.155 0.178 





Panel B: Time subsamples 
 Mean (first half) 
2003Q4-2008Q4 
Mean (second half) 
2009Q1-2014Q4 
FOWN (%) 0.302 0.125 
BM 1.318 0.997 
MKTCAP (mil, RMB) 5300 9290 
VOL 0.085 0.060 
TURN 0.241 0.172 
PRC (RMB) 8.895 12.800 
AGE (month) 87.144 115.769 
DIV 0.006 0.007 
RETt-3,t 0.002 0.015 
RETt-12,t-3 0.017 0.014 
S180_dum 0.116 0.091 
Crosslisting_dum 0.029 0.031 
Stateown 0.266 0.067 
Leverage 0.438 0.466 
Current ratio 0.015 0.025 
H5 0.190 0.172 
Legal person own 0.221 0.088 
ROA 0.020 0.017 
Domestic_inst_lag 0.121 0.150 
 
Number of observations 27,738 50,825 
  
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics. Our sample period runs from 2003Q4 to 2014Q4. The data are 
obtained from the Wind Database and RESSET. FOWN is total foreign institutional ownership in tradable 
shares. MKTCAP is market capitalization in RMB million. AGE is firm age measured as the number of months 
from the first day of return appears on Wind. BM is book to market ratio and it is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. DIV is cash dividend (after tax) divided by stock closing price; DIV is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. PRC is stock closing price, and is denoted in RMB. VOL is the monthly volatility over the previous 
year, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. TURN is average monthly turnover rate over the previous quarter. 
RETt-3,t is cumulative gross return over the current quarter. RETt-12,t-3 is cumulative gross return over the nine 
months preceding the beginning of filing quarter. Both RETt-3,t and RETt-12,t-3 are winsorized at the  1st and 99th 
percentile. S180_dum is a dummy variable takes the value of one if the stock is included in either the Shanghai 
180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index, zero otherwise. Crosslisting_dum is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the firm is cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or New York Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. 
Stateown is state ownership fraction of the firm. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total asset. 
Current ratio is calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. It serves as proxy for the  firm’s ability 
to pay short-term obligations, and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. H5 denotes the Herfindal 5 index, 
which is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Legal person own denotes the legal person ownership fraction 
of the firm. ROA denotes return on asset (ROA) is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Domestic_inst_lag 
denotes one lag of domestic institutional ownership, and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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BM 1.059 1.079 -0.020 0.717 0.715 0.002  
MKTCAP(mil, RMB) 15500 7300 8250*** 5640 2890 2750***  
VOL 0.060 0.069 -0.008*** 0.055 0.060 -0.005***  
TURN 0.205 0.193 0.012*** 0.121 0.094 0.027***  
PRC (RMB) 15.322 12.024 3.298*** 11.33 8.72 2.61***  
AGE (month) 104.65 98.41 6.24*** 105 96 9***  
DIV 0.011 0.006 0.005*** 0.007 0.002 0.005***  
RETt-3,t 0.020 0.0007 0.013*** 0.012 -0.0005 0.0125***  
RETt-12,t-3 0.049 0.011 0.038*** 0.033 -0.003 0.036***  
S180_dum 0.220 0.084 0.136*** 0 0 0  
Crosslisting_dum 0.057 0.027 0.030*** 0 0 0  
Stateown 0.165 0.133 0.032*** 0 0 0  
Leverage 0.456 0.439 0.017*** 0.469 0.448 0.021***  
Current ratio 0.021 0.024 -0.003*** 0.013 0.014 -0.001***  
H5 0.207 0.178 0.029*** 0.181 0.148 0.033***  
Legal person own 0.128 0.147 -0.019*** 0 0.0005 -0.0005***  
ROA 0.032 0.018 0.014*** 0.022 0.012 0.010***  
Domestic_inst_lag 0.157 0.135 0.022*** 0.101 0.067 0.034***  
 
 
This table reports difference in mean and difference in median (ranksum) tests of firm characteristics between 
two groups, i.e. QFII holding stocks and non-QFII holding stocks. The first three columns report the average 
values for QFII holdings, non-QFII holdings, and their differences, respectively. The last three columns report 
the median values for QFII holdings, non-QFII holdings, and their differences. See Appendix A for variable 





Table 4. Decile descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the 10 QFII deciles. The sample includes only positive QFII ownership (n=6417). The sample is then segregated into deciles using 
yearly FOWN breakpoints. The numbers in the columns under the headings D1-D10 are mean values in each decile. D1 is the decile with least QFII ownership, and D10 is 
the decile with the largest foreign ownership. Se Appendix A for variable descriptions. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 
10 percent level. 
 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D10-D1 
FOWN (%) 0.243 0.472 0.688 0.932 1.240 1.614 2.061 2.746 4.010 8.191 7.685*** 
BM 1.523 1.255 1.117 1.057 0.976 0.879 0.995 0.948 0.895 0.943 -0.580*** 
MKTCAP (mil,rmb) 24600 22800 15400 15700 16700 13700 12100 12000 10500 11700 -12900*** 
VOL 0.066 0.061 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.056 0.057 0.060 0.062 0.063 -0.003 
TURN 0.201 0.211 0.229 0.209 0.201 0.188 0.202 0.199 0.214 0.194 -0.007 
PRC (RMB) 8.879 13.124 14.550 16.148 16.213 16.392 17.177 18.759 17.050 14.968 6.089*** 
AGE(month) 125.084 112.355 112.308 113.819 106.728 102.054 99.816 93.913 94.736 85.541 -39.543*** 
DIV 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.003*** 
RETt-3,t 0.015 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.027 0.034 0.018** 
RETt-12,t-3 0.025 0.014 0.035 0.038 0.047 0.062 0.061 0.052 0.086 0.072 0.047*** 
S180_dum 0.263 0.263 0.234 0.239 0.194 0.234 0.178 0.183 0.160 0.247 0.016 
Crosslisting_dum 0.126 0.069 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.057 0.041 0.067 0.062 0.058 -0.068*** 
Stateown 0.107 0.126 0.146 0.151 0.145 0.149 0.174 0.186 0.207 0.261 0.154*** 
Leverage 0.496 0.480 0.445 0.449 0.449 0.422 0.444 0.472 0.458 0.441 -0.056*** 
Current ratio 0.016 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.018 0.002 
H5 0.255 0.218 0.204 0.204 0.202 0.185 0.181 0.192 0.208 0.224 -0.031 
Legal person own 0.061 0.088 0.110 0.112 0.116 0.119 0.148 0.151 0.169 0.204 0.143*** 
ROA  0.015 0.023 0.026 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.027*** 
Domestic_inst_lag 0.140 0.137 0.140 0.161 0.180 0.171 0.178 0.173 0.169 0.123 -0.017* 
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Table 5. Determinants of foreign ownership in Chinese stock markets 
  Full period First half Second half 
 2003Q4-2014Q4 2003Q4-2008Q4 2009Q1-2014Q4 
BM 0.058*** -0.022 0.116*** 
 [3.307] [-0.737] [5.080] 
MKTCAP -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.019 
 [-7.159] [-4.640] [-1.177] 
VOL 0.003 -0.167*** 0.015 
 [0.163] [-3.618] [0.830] 
TURN -0.045*** -0.105*** -0.044*** 
 [-4.865] [-4.813] [-4.349] 
PRC 0.250*** 0.194*** 0.350*** 
 [12.083] [5.250] [14.539] 
AGE -0.033*** 0.023 -0.039** 
 [-2.646] [1.162] [-2.318] 
DIV -0.003 -0.009 0.000 
 [-0.753] [-1.278] [0.078] 
RETt-3,t 0.216*** 0.371*** 0.094 
 [2.676] [3.200] [0.820] 
RETt-12,t-3 0.024 -0.008 0.017 
 [0.522] [-0.106] [0.266] 
S180_dum -0.006 -0.019 -0.165*** 
 [-0.237] [-0.468] [-4.423] 
Crosslisting_dum 0.123*** 0.148** 0.041 
 [2.872] [2.263] [0.736] 
Stateown 0.956*** 0.093 0.725*** 
 [19.715] [0.867] [10.735] 
Leverage 0.052 0.134 -0.059 
 [0.798] [1.299] [-0.687] 
Current ratio -1.209** -4.574*** 0.382 
 [-2.419] [-2.799] [0.804] 
H5 -0.888*** -0.221 -1.253*** 
 [-10.333] [-1.432] [-12.515] 
Legalown 0.841*** 0.156 0.719*** 
 [16.702] [1.491] [11.443] 
ROA 2.861*** 1.455*** 2.118*** 
 [10.609] [3.238] [6.008] 
Domestic_inst_lag 0.020 -0.253** 0.144** 
 [0.358] [-2.461] [2.244] 
Constant -2.549*** -2.615*** -4.374*** 
 [-10.058] [-6.051] [-12.609] 
Wald Chi-Square 1177.14*** 205.4*** 831.91*** 
Observations 71,503 24,634 46,869 
 
This table reports the results from our baseline regressions, using zero-inflated beta regression. The dependent 
variable is quarterly aggregated foreign ownership of QFIIs. Non-QFIIs in each quarter are assigned a value of 
zero. Our sample period runs from 2003Q4 to 2014Q4. Results for the full period are reported in first column and 
the estimation outputs for the first half (2003Q4–2008Q4) and second half (2009Q1–2014Q4) of the sample 
period are reported in the second and third columns, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable 
 34 
descriptions. BM, MKTCAP, VOL, TURN, PRC, AGE, DIV are log scaled. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 6. Changes in QFII preferences 
  Full sample 
Only QFIIs present 
prior to 2009 
Only firms listed 
prior to 2009 
BM×post2008 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.123*** 
 [3.262] [3.022] [3.110] 
MKTCAP×post2008 0.048** 0.051** 0.043* 
 [2.207] [2.253] [1.870] 
VOL×post2008 0.146*** 0.166*** 0.137*** 
 [3.132] [3.442] [2.731] 
TURN×post2008 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.096*** 
 [3.891] [4.058] [4.190] 
PRC×post2008 0.098** 0.093** 0.113** 
 [2.370] [2.174] [2.533] 
AGE×post2008 -0.060** -0.048* -0.023 
 [-2.378] [-1.809] [-0.680] 
DIV×post2008 0.011 0.013 0.014 
 [1.273] [1.508] [1.507] 
RETt-3,t×post2008 -0.247 -0.312* -0.234 
 [-1.505] [-1.789] [-1.351] 
RETt-12,t-3×post2008 -0.730*** -0.712*** -0.706*** 
 [-5.481] [-5.242] [-5.136] 
S180_dum×post2008 0.005 0.007 -0.004 
 [0.049] [0.066] [-0.039] 
Crosslisting_dum×post2008 -0.161 -0.170 -0.241 
 [-0.834] [-0.867] [-1.246] 
Stateown×post2008 0.596*** 0.608*** 0.668*** 
 [4.935] [4.893] [5.382] 
Leverage×post2008 -0.217 -0.161 -0.210 
 [-1.640] [-1.165] [-1.464] 
Current ratio×post2008 5.528*** 5.713*** 6.664*** 
 [3.524] [3.548] [3.824] 
H5×post2008 -0.891*** -0.956*** -0.881*** 
 [-5.096] [-5.223] [-4.698] 
Legalown×post2008 0.516*** 0.499*** 0.686*** 
 [4.439] [4.060] [5.418] 
ROA×post2008 0.244 0.271 0.084 
 [0.436] [0.467] [0.143] 
Domestic_inst_lag×post2008 0.403*** 0.412*** 0.455*** 
 [3.477] [3.382] [3.679] 
Constant -2.816*** -2.847*** -2.393*** 
 [-7.643] [-7.662] [-6.143] 
Wald Chi-Square 1597.35*** 1435.26** 1538.96*** 
Observations 71,503 71,503 58,317 
 
This table reports the results from the regression in equation (2), using zero-inflated beta regression. The 
dependent variable is the quarterly aggregated foreign ownership of QFIIs. Non-QFIIs in each quarter are assigned 
a value of zero. Our sample period runs from 2003Q4 to 2014Q4. For the sake of brevity, we only report the 
coefficients on the interaction terms. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample. Column 2 reports the results 
with the sample of QFIIs prior to 2009, and Column 3 reports the results for the sample of firms listed prior to 
2009. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. BM, MKTCAP, VOL, TURN, PRC, AGE, DIV are log 
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scaled. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. International risk environment and QFII preferences 
Risk measure Crisis indicator VIX level 
post2008 -1.025** -1.303*** 
 [-2.199] [-2.774] 
Crisis -0.215***  
  [-5.309]  








Vix  -0.005*** 
  [-2.730] 
Vix × post2008  0.021*** 
  [6.776] 
Vix × post2008 ×   -0.017* 
Stateown  [-1.892] 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Wald Chi-Square 1668.65*** 1651.43*** 
Observations 71,503 71,503 
 
This table reports the estimation results using an international risk aversion proxy for the full period. We use a 
zero-inflated beta regression and equation 2 with variables and interactions for risk environment added. Crisis is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the quarter falls within the period 2007Q4–2009Q2, and zero otherwise. 
We repeat the estimation by replacing Crisis with the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index 
or VIX, as an alternative proxy for international risk environment and report the regression results in second 
column. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent 
level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 8. QFII interest in central vs local government owned firms 












Legalown x post2008 0.474*** 











Wald Chi-Square 1609.14*** 
Observations 71,503 
 
This table reports zero inflated beta regression results. We use CSMAR database-based segregation of SOEs 
into SOEs with central government as controlling shareholder and SOEs with provincial/municipal government 
as the controlling shareholder. We introduce Central_govt dummy variable in the regression equation (2). It 
takes a value of 1 for firms with central government as controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. T-statistics 
are reported in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 
percent level. 
